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LEGAL ACCESS AND ATTORNEY 
ADVERTISING 
Adapted from remarks presented to the AALS Section on Professional 
Responsibility, January 8, 2011 
 
NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM* 
My current project involves law firms I call settlement mills, which are 
high volume, heavy advertising, personal injury law firms in the United 
States.  I’m going to begin by briefly describing what settlement mills are 
and then consider how they might shed light on what we know about 
attorney advertising and access to justice in the contingency fee context.  
We have now had attorney advertising in the United States for some three 
decades.  In that time, at least in the personal injury context, there is some 
evidence that attorney advertising has made legal services more readily 
available to those of limited means—just as proponents of attorney 
advertising hoped and predicted.  But attorney advertising, while 
apparently narrowing one justice gap, has perhaps produced another.  This 
justice gap, I will suggest, is based not on claimants’ willingness to retain 
counsel, or even claimants’ ability to afford counsel, but is rather based on 
claimants’ ability to choose counsel wisely, and it manifests itself in the 
kind of counsel one selects. 
Thus far, my broader project studies twelve settlement mills from ten 
different states.  I’ve done extensive original research to build a composite 
view of these firms by combing through files from attorney disciplinary 
proceedings, reviewing records from attorney malpractice actions in state 
and federal courts, and conducting fifty telephone interviews with past and 
current settlement mill attorneys and non-attorney employees.  To be sure, 
twelve firms is not a huge number, but these twelve firms, in their heydays, 
collectively accounted for the settlement of more than 15,000 claims 
annually, which is, it seems, a fairly significant amount of attorney-client 
interaction.1 
                                                          
*Copyright 2011 by Nora Freeman Engstrom. Assistant Professor, Stanford Law 
School.  My thanks to Scott L. Cummings and Robert L. Rabin for helpful comments 
on previous drafts. 
 1. Indeed, during its roughly fifteen-year existence, one of the firms I studied 
1
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So, what are settlement mills?  In a recent paper entitled Run-of-the-Mill 
Justice, I walk through ten characteristics that define settlement mills and 
help to distinguish these firms from other, more typical, personal injury 
practices.2  Here, I’ll just emphasize four traits that are particularly salient.  
First, and most relevant for our purposes, settlement mills are aggressive 
advertisers.  Attorney advertising is big business.  But despite the seeming 
ubiquity of attorney ads and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on 
attorney advertising annually, in terms of numbers, relatively few personal 
injury lawyers advertise on television.3  Most don’t.  Meanwhile, even 
heavy advertisers still typically obtain the majority of their clients from 
traditional sources, namely practitioner referrals and client word-of-mouth.4  
In contrast, all of the settlement mills I have so far studied advertise; they 
all advertise on television, and they all obtain the majority or vast majority 
of clients from these advertising efforts.5 
The second notable characteristic is that settlement mills have a high 
volume of small claims.  Personal injury lawyers are known for having 
                                                          
reportedly settled a whopping 30,000 claims.  Penny Font, Disbarred, But Not 
Disbranded, BUSINESSREPORT.COM (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.businessreport.com/news/2009/may/18/disbarred-not-disbranded-lgl1/ 
(quoting E. Eric Guirard).  Another firm founder is likewise on record saying that, in 
his twenty-year practice, he represented “thousands and thousands” of accident victims.  
Transcript of Record at 10, Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Weiss, No. 94-CI-18282 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Weiss Disciplinary Transcript] (testimony of 
Joe W. Weiss).  In comparison, only about 2,200 civil claims are resolved each year by 
juries in all of the nation’s federal courts.  See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR JAMES C. DUFF, 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS, 388, tbl.T1, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness 
/2010/appendices/T01Sep10.pdf. 
 2. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009). 
 3. A recent study found that, even among those Texas lawyers with the highest 
volume of relatively low-dollar claims, only 13% advertised on television.  Stephen 
Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The 
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1789 n.19 
(2002); see also AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT 
THE CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 52 (1995) [hereinafter, 
ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING] (reporting on a 1993 Gallup Poll commissioned by 
the ABA Journal, which found that 61% of respondents indicated that their firms 
advertised but that only 2% did so on television); Bar Defends Advertisement Rules, 
FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 26, 1989 (quoting Florida Bar President Stephen N. Zack, who 
indicated that fewer than fifty of Florida’s 35,000 attorneys advertised on television). 
 4. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 3, at 1789 (showing that, though most Texas 
plaintiffs’ lawyers advertise, lawyer advertising is not any lawyer group’s predominant 
client source); see also HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 47-
50, 55 (2004) (“Among the personal injury specialists who do advertise, an average of 
21 percent of the clients come as a direct result of the advertising; only two of the 
personal injury specialists reported obtaining half or more of their clients from 
advertising.”). 
 5. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1492-93, 1521-24. 
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high claim volumes, as compared to other lawyers in other specialties.6  
And settlement mills’ case volumes are roughly triple the personal injury 
average.7  While studies suggest that conventional personal injury attorneys 
have around seventy open files at any one time and serve roughly 110 
clients per year, the average settlement mill negotiator might juggle 250 
claims at any one time and settle around 350 claims annually.8  Some 
lawyers handle substantially more.  For example, a lawyer from a Georgia 
firm reported that she personally settled 600 or 700 claims in a mere 
thirteen-month-span, which roughly translates into settling a claim every 
four working hours.9  Most of these claims, meanwhile, are small, 
principally soft-tissue injury claims (e.g., sprains, strains, contusions, and 
whiplash) sustained in auto accidents.10  Thus, it is fair to think of 
settlement mills as auto accident specialists. 
Third, settlement mills tend to have an entrepreneurial, rather than a 
professional, orientation.  As one settlement mill partner put it: “I 
always . . . approached this as a business first and a law firm second.”11  At 
these firms, there is a lot of delegation to non-attorney employees, and 
there is little emphasis on traditional “lawyering,” meaning there is very 
little legal research, little factual investigation of claims, and little 
substantive interaction with clients.12  In fact, at some firms, it’s not 
unusual for lawyers and clients to never meet.13  The lawyers at such firms, 
perhaps not surprisingly, tend to describe the work as being very routinized 
                                                          
 6. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 435-36 tbl.B.1 (1982) (showing “Mean Number of Clients per 
Year” for various specialties). 
 7. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1492. 
 8. Sara Parikh, How the Spider Catches the Fly: Referral Networks in the 
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2006) (citing JOHN P. 
HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005) 
(unpublished data)) (reporting that Chicago plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers surveyed 
in 1995 served an average of 142 clients per year); Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its 
Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiff‘s Personal Injury Bar, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, at 73 (2001) (reporting that low-end personal injury 
practitioners in Chicago served an average of seventy-nine clients per year). 
 9. Sworn Statement of S.S. at 6 (Aug. 19, 1998). 
 10. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1499-1500. 
 11. Brett Barrouquere, Attorneys Hit Local Airwaves—Many Say Business Savvy 
As Important As Legal Skills, ADVOC. (BATON ROUGE), Nov. 30, 2003 (quoting E. Eric 
Guirard); see also Weiss Disciplinary Transcript, supra note 1, at 19 (testimony of Joe 
W. Weiss) (“I do my best to conduct my business as best I can.”). 
 12. To be sure, it is not unusual for even conventional personal injury attorneys to 
spend comparatively little time engaged in legal research, investigating claims, and 
preparing pleadings.  See KRITZER, supra note 4, at 99, 136.  Nor is it unusual for 
conventional attorneys to delegate tasks to underlings and keep a careful eye on the 
bottom line.  Id. at 112-13, 137.  What sets settlement mills apart, though, is the 
extreme emphasis on efficiency, the extent to which procedures are mechanized, and 
the lopsided balance struck between the conceptualization of the practice of law as a 
business, rather than a profession. 
 13. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1493-95, 1500-01. 
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and mechanized, with some describing their work in the following manner: 
• “I might as well have been working on an assembly line.”14 
• “I felt like a claims adjuster with a law license.”15 
• “Most of the cases I handled, I didn’t even know the facts of the 
case.”16 
• “[I]t’s a cookie-cutter. It’s routine. You call and they offer you 
$500 and you ask for $2,000 a month, and then you go to 
$1,000.  If you get $1,200, you do it, but it’s just boom, boom, 
boom like that.”17 
• “We’ve got a Stop and Go’s here.  Drive in, get you something 
to drink, get out on the road.  That’s the way they’re run.  It is 
not a conventional law firm.  They do not want you to practice 
conventional law.”18 
Fourth, and related to the quotes above, at settlement mills, the focus is 
on settlements.  It is not on lawsuits.  It is not on referrals.  It is certainly 
not on trials.19  This focus on settling is sometimes maintained by quotas or 
contests, imposed on settlement negotiators, requiring that negotiators—
who may or may not be lawyers—settle a given number or dollar value of 
claims within a particular time period or offering rewards or prizes to those 
who do.20  One firm in Louisiana, for example, used a series of carrots and 
sticks to spur settlements.  At that firm, non-attorneys negotiated 
settlements, and their compensation was tied to fees they generated.  The 
firm bestowed a monthly lion award on the highest fee generator (to reward 
the “king of the jungle”) and gave a monthly “monkey” award to the lowest 
fee generator, who was said to have a “monkey on their back.”  And last 
but not least, the firm sponsored group contests, whereby, if the negotiators 
generated a particular amount in fees during a particular period, all in the 
firm would be rewarded with group trips to exotic locales.21  Further 
                                                          
 14. Telephone Interview with R.J. (Apr. 8, 2008). 
 15. Telephone Interview with K.R. (May 1, 2008). 
 16. Sworn Statement of S.S. at 41 (Aug. 19, 1998). 
 17. Transcript of Louisiana Disciplinary Bd. Hr’g, In re Lawrence D. Sledge, No. 
00-DB-135 (Feb. 16, 2001), at 335 (testimony of Lawrence D. Sledge). 
 18. Telephone Interview with D.W. (May 8, 2008). 
 19. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1495-98, 1502-03 (describing the relative 
paucity of lawsuits and trials); see also Telephone Interview with E.C. (Apr. 22, 2008) 
(explaining that, at his law firm, his job was to “[s]ettle cases.  Set ‘em up and settle 
them”). 
 20. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1501. 
 21. See Transcript of Louisiana Disciplinary Bd. Hr’g, In re E. Eric Guirard & 
Thomas R. Pittenger, File No. 04-DB-005 (Sept. 23, 2004), at 216-28 (testimony of E. 
Eric Guirard) (describing these incentives).  Similar incentives were apparently used to 
spur settlements at the Azar firm of Colorado.  There, attorneys were reportedly 
expected to generate $30,000 to $40,000 in fees per month.  The highest fee generator 
each month was, according to one source, recognized with a “shark” award.  And 
attorneys were compensated via straight commissions rather than salaries.  See 
4
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highlighting the focus on settlement, a few of the firms I’ve studied never, 
as far as I can tell, tried a case to verdict despite settling, literally, 
thousands of claims.22 
Hopefully that brief overview helps to set the scene for what settlement 
mills look like and clarifies at least some of the ways in which these firms 
differ from conventional counsel.  Obviously settlement mills raise a host 
of important questions implicating legal ethics, tort law, bargaining 
behavior, and so on.  However, the issue I want to focus on here is what 
settlement mills might be able to tell us about access to justice and attorney 
advertising. 
In the United States it is well known that we have two tiers of justice—
one for the haves and one for the have-nots.  It is a dynamic that plays out 
in various substantive areas of law, from criminal law, to family law, to 
landlord tenant law, to bankruptcy law, and so on.  The rich, it is said, 
benefit from highly personalized legal services.23  The have-nots, on the 
other hand, when lucky enough to be represented at all, are, and have long 
been, represented by under-paid and over-burdened practitioners whose 
adversarial impulses are muted by some mix of high caseloads, insufficient 
support, and inadequate training.24 
The one place that this class justice is often thought not to obtain—
where it is commonly said that there’s “equality of representation”—is in 
the particular world of personal injury.25  That’s because we have the 
                                                          
Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1501. 
 22. See, e.g., Matter of Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 275 (Ariz. 1987) (describing the law 
firm of Zang & Whitmer, where “no attorney . . . had tried a personal injury case to a 
conclusion” and there was “a firm policy of not taking cases to trial”); Engstrom, supra 
note 2, at 1509 (reporting that the Dupayne firm, during the late 1990s, “did not take a 
single case to trial”); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011) (discussing the Weiss and Rogers law firms, which, 
according to some accounts, did not conduct any jury trials during the period of study). 
 23. See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 
50 (1986) (describing the work of a law firm lawyer for the affluent as “the work of a 
fine custom tailor: highly individualized and with exquisite fit to a particular 
situation”); see also BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE 
MEANS 4 (1970) (“Large efficient law firms have developed as a response to the 
needs—and ability to pay—of the more affluent segments of society.  And the large 
firms seem to be serving these clients well.”). 
 24. Approximately 80% of low-income residents’ legal needs are wholly unmet.  
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS A-1 (2009).  For 
descriptions of the disappointing services often available to the remaining 20%, see 
MARJORIE GIRTH, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS 76-77 (1976); Jerome E. Carlin et al., Civil 
Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9, 55-58 
(1966); Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 
UCLA L. REV. 381, 385 (1965). 
 25. PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS 
OF TORT LAW 123 (1997)  (“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers . . . function in the tort system to 
provide injured persons with something that aggrieved citizens dealing with other areas 
of law often lack: access to the courts and equality of representation.”) (emphasis 
5
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contingency fee.  It is very widely used.26  And the contingency fee is 
thought to be the “great leveler” or, in H. Laurence Ross’s words: “[T]he 
contingent fee . . . makes the little man’s claim as interesting to the lawyer 
as the big man’s claim.”27 
Yet, my study of settlement mills suggests that the picture might be 
somewhat more complicated.  Traditionally, some studies suggest that the 
poor have been less likely than their wealthier counterparts to seek 
compensation following an accidental injury.28  Poor individuals’ failure to 
initiate claims, meanwhile, seems attributable not to a lack of financial 
                                                          
added); see also infra note 27.  Of course, despite this lofty rhetoric, some inequity 
invariably remains because lost wages are recoverable via the tort system, and 
consequently, wealthy individuals will tend to suffer (and receive compensation for) 
higher economic loss. 
 26. Approximately 96% of individual personal injury plaintiffs pay their lawyers 
on a contingent-fee basis.  See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil 
Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15 (1996). 
 27. H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 75 (1970); Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a 
Law . . . What Might Happen If Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 321, 341 (1998) (“Whatever else might be said about the contingent fee, it is a 
great leveler.”); accord James W. Bollinger, Contingent Fees—The New Suggestion of 
Judicial Supervision, 69 CENT. L.J. 355, 356 (1909) (“The contingent fee actually 
makes the courthouse the one temple of justice for all, equally accessible to both the 
rich and the poor.”); Lee S. Kreindler, The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests Are 
Actually Being Served?, 14 FORUM 406, 406 (1979) (“The contingent fee makes it 
possible for anyone in our society to get the best lawyer.”); Philip H. Corboy, 
Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the Courthouse Door, 2 LITIG. 27, 34 
(1976) (stating that “the contingent fee’s advantage” is that it “equalizes otherwise 
unequal litigants”).  Notably, a number of states have commissioned comprehensive 
legal needs studies in recent years, and a number of those studies don’t even inquire 
about personal injury. 
 28. For example, in one 1957 study of auto accident claimants in New York City, 
Robert Hunting and Gloria Neuwirth found that “[f]ollowing a minor car accident, over 
one-quarter (27%) of those with low socio-economic status (‘SES’) took no action at 
all, while practically no one (2%) with high SES failed to act.”  ROBERT HUNTING & 
GLORIA NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY?  A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT CLAIMS 10, 98 (1962); accord ROBERT L. HOUCHENS, RAND, AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION VOL. III: PAYMENTS FROM ALL SOURCES 17 (1985) 
(analyzing a survey of auto accident victims who sustained an injury between August 
1975 and August 1977 and concluding that the likelihood of receiving some payment 
“apparently increases with . . . family income”); see also ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., 
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY 
REPARATION 257 (1964) (finding that “seriously injured individuals who did not file a 
suit tend to have lower incomes and are more likely to be in nonprofessional 
occupations”); Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More?  A Case-Control Study 
of Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1699 (1993) 
(finding that poor and uninsured patients were significantly less likely to file medical 
malpractice claims, after controlling for injury severity).  Not all studies reach this 
conclusion, however.  See, e.g., FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & FATEN SABRY, NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., THE PROPENSITY TO SUE: WHY DO PEOPLE SEEK LEGAL 
ACTIONS 8 (2004) (analyzing RAND data from 1988-89 and concluding that income 
“tend[s] not to have a robust effect on propensity to claim or sue”); AM. BAR ASS’N, 
LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MAJOR FINDINGS FROM 
THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 20 tbl.4-I (1994) (finding no meaningful 
difference in the claiming rates of low and moderate-income individuals). 
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need—which would, of course, cut in the opposite direction—but rather to 
a lack of information concerning rights and potential remedies and also a 
lack of knowledge about, and contact with, lawyers.29 
Attorney advertising, which came about in 1977 with the Supreme 
Court’s landmark opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, was supposed to 
change that.30  In deciding Bates, the Court explicitly noted that the “the 
middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by 
the legal profession,” and the Court expressed its faith that attorney ads 
would dispel unfounded fears about lawyers and would help to expand 
legal access to those of limited means.31  Others, too, predicted that 
attorney advertising would spur additional claiming and attorney retention.  
In the year following the Bates opinion, for example, one commentator 
declared: “The advent of ‘attorney advertisements’ will add further to the 
amount of automobile negligence litigation started by injured parties.  
Newspaper ads mentioning auto accidents . . . will also raise a question in 
the minds of the public, who now believe they have no right to sue in 
tort.”32 
Now, at a distance of some three decades, there is some evidence that the 
Court’s hope—and the above prediction—have come to pass.  In the 
decades following the Bates decision, advertisements for legal services—
and particularly personal injury legal services, which now make up the bulk 
of television attorney advertising—have proliferated.33  Indeed, attorney 
                                                          
 29. Accord Bruce Campbell & Susette M. Talarico, Access to Legal Services: 
Examining Common Assumptions, 66 JUDICATURE 313 (1982-83) (reporting on a 
Georgia survey which found that low-SES individuals (experiencing a variety of legal 
problems) were substantially less likely to hire lawyers or identify problems as 
requiring legal assistance and speculating that these trends might be traceable, in part, 
to poor individuals’ lack of knowledge about the availability of legal services); see 
HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 28, at 99-100 (speculating that low-SES individuals 
often fail to pursue a claim because of, inter alia, their “lack of understanding of what 
their rights may be” and their “lack of contact with lawyers”). 
 30. 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24, 34, 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (No. 76-316), 1976 WL 178669 
(calling for the elimination of the ban on attorney advertising because, inter alia, “there 
is not now sufficient information available to the public concerning legal services” and 
“[t]he ban on advertising inhibits the assertion of legal rights by the segment of society 
least familiar with its rights”).    
 31. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-77 (declaring that the profession’s advertising ban 
“likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor 
and the unknowledgeable” and speculating that permitting advertising “might increase 
the use of the judicial machinery”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also James 
Sokolove, President, Trial Lawyers Marketing Association, Letter to the Editor, NAT’L 
L.J., July 31, 1989, at 2 (“If we are truly to provide ‘justice for all,’ we must keep the 
doors to our legal system open.  And legal services advertising provides the key to that 
door.”). 
 32. Lawrence C. Falzon, Comment, Michigan No-Fault: The Rise and Fall of 
Socialized Negligence, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 99, 117 (1978). 
 33. For information on the growth of attorney advertising, see Richard J. Cebula, 
Historical and Economic Perspectives on Lawyer Advertising and Lawyer Image, 15 
7
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television outlays have grown exponentially, from $366,000 in 1977 to 
roughly $428 million in 2002, in inflation-adjusted dollars.34  
Simultaneously, studies suggest: (1) significantly more auto accident 
victims are seeking compensation for injuries they sustain; and (2) 
significantly more auto accident victims are retaining counsel to press their 
claims.35  Indeed, Insurance Research Council consumer panel survey data 
show more than a doubling of the proportion of represented auto accident 
claimants between 1977 and 2002, from 19% to 43%.36 
In sum, if the Supreme Court’s goal in Bates was to improve the public’s 
knowledge about legal options and expand access to legal services, at least 
in the personal injury automobile context, it appears the Court might well 
have succeeded.  Although other factors could surely explain the above 
trends—including, for example, the substantial growth in the size of the 
legal profession during this same period37—it’s certainly plausible that the 
                                                          
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 321 (1998).  For the fact that the top spenders on legal 
advertising are personal injury or plaintiff-related law firms, see ABA COMM’N ON 
ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 130 (“Most television advertisements have been for 
personal injury or other contingency-fee based services.”); Maria Aspan, Getting Law 
Firms To Like Commercials, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C5 (reporting that “the top 
10 spenders” on legal advertising “are all personal-injury or plaintiff-related law 
firms”). 
 34. See Cebula, supra note 33, at 321 (providing advertising data from 1977 
through 1992); KANTAR MEDIA, TREND REPORT FOR 2000-2004 (providing advertising 
data for 2002) (on file with author).  I converted the above advertising figures to 2011 
dollars using an inflation calculator available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
 35. For data on increased claiming, see INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO 
INJURY CLAIMS, tbl.A-1 (2008) (showing that, between 1980 and 2006, the number of 
paid bodily injury claims per 100 property damage claims rose dramatically, from 17.9 
to 24.5); INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, FRAUD AND BUILDUP IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS: 
PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE AUTO INSURANCE SYSTEM 25 (1996) (noting a “steady 
increase[]” in bodily injury liability claim frequency from 1980 to 1993).  The growth 
in claims does not appear to be confined to the auto context.  See Robert Rabin, Tort 
Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 
n.11 (1988) (comparing medical malpractice claims data from 1956 and 1963 with data 
from 1984 and 1985 and observing that “over the past two decades the incidence of 
claims against medical practitioners has risen dramatically”).  For data on increased 
attorney retention, see INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES: A 
CONSUMER PANEL SURVEY OF AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 36 (2004) [hereinafter, IRC, 
CONSUMER PANEL]; ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW 
2d § 10:4 at 10-3 (2002) (“During the period from 1977 to 1987, according to surveys 
involving almost 100,000 claims, there was a 42.5 percent increase in the number of 
accident claimants who were represented by attorneys.”). 
 36. IRC, CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 35, at 36.  Of course, this discussion tables 
the difficult—and contested—normative question of whether increased claiming and 
increased representation by counsel are positive or negative developments.  There is 
also some evidence that attorney advertising has increased attorney retention in other 
areas too.  See, e.g., Madeline Johnson, et al., Attorney Advertising and Changes in the 
Demand for Wills, 22 J. OF ADVERTISING 35 (Mar. 1993) (analyzing time series data 
from 1974 through 1989 tracking the ratio of estates probated without a will to estates 
probated with a will and finding a drop in intestate deaths, starting in 1977, suggesting 
(albeit not proving) that attorney advertising, which came about in 1977, increased the 
demand for wills). 
 37. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 80-81 (2010) 
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growth of attorney advertising has played a role.38  But now, we see a new 
wrinkle when we shift focus from the identity of those who claim or fail to 
claim to the identity of the lawyer one selects. 
When I interviewed past and current settlement mill practitioners, I 
usually asked them to describe their typical client.  These responses are 
fairly representative of the answers I received: 
• “[T]hey were all poor; they were all uneducated.”39 
• “Lower income.”40 
• “Working class . . . . People who don’t have any particular 
understanding of the legal system, except what they’ve heard 
from television.”41 
So, here is a puzzle.  Settlement mills, to be sure, have certain clear 
advantages; as I have discussed at length elsewhere, they actually have 
much to recommend them.42  But they are, at bottom, a cut-rate legal 
service provider.  And, despite the existence of the contingency fee—the 
“great leveler”—this cut-rate legal service (which, incidentally, costs no 
less, on a percentage basis, than a traditional legal service) is 
predominantly utilized by low-income clients.43 
What explains this puzzle?  There are, I think, a few possibilities.  First, 
as Barbara Curran reported after her 1977 national survey, when low-
income individuals pursue tort claims, they are perhaps more likely to seek 
the assistance of counsel, presumably because of a sense, which may or 
may not be well-founded, that they lack the literacy, sophistication, or 
savvy to handle the problem effectively without legal assistance.44  If, as 
                                                          
(highlighting the near-quadrupling in the size of the legal profession from 1970 to 
2009). 
 38. Accord MARJORIE M. BERTE, HIT ME—I NEED THE MONEY: THE POLITICS OF 
AUTO INSURANCE REFORM 41 (1991) (attributing increased attorney involvement in 
auto insurance claims to lawyer advertising); JOOST, supra note 35, at § 10:11, at 10-13 
(same); see JOHN D. STUCKEMEYER, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., “EXTRAORDINARY HOW 
POTENT CHEAP MUSIC IS”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING LAWYER ADVERTISING 2-7 
(1993) (attributing increase in auto accident claiming to the increase in attorney 
advertising). 
 39. Telephone Interview with C.P. (May 20, 2008). 
 40. Telephone Interview with T.H. (Apr. 15, 2008). 
 41. Telephone Interview with T.T. (July 14, 2008); see also Engstrom, supra note 
2, at 1524 (describing typical settlement mill clients). 
 42. See generally Engstrom, supra note 22. 
 43. For more on settlement mill fees, see id. at 845-49. 
 44. BARBARA CURRAN ET AL., THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL 
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 152, 156-57 (1977) (“Problem-havers who consulted 
lawyers on tort matters had substantially lower mean income ($8000) than those who 
did not ($11,000).”); see also HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 28, at 98-99 
(reporting that “[o]f those who decide to take action, persons with the lowest SES are 
most likely to employ a lawyer”).  But cf. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP, ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES, Vol. 1, 338 tbl.46S (1970) 
(comparing attorney retention rates by “highest grade completed” and reporting that 
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Curran suggests, the poor disproportionately want lawyers even for their 
very small claims, and if, as noted previously, settlement mills occupy the 
particular market niche willing to accept these very small claims, then that 
will predictably affect settlement mills’ clientele.45  Second, as also noted 
previously, settlement mills settle, and settle quickly, and the poor, often 
lacking sturdy safety nets, might disproportionately prefer payment certain 
and without delay.  This, indeed, resonates with something Jerome Carlin 
found in his now-classic studies of low-income clients, when he reported 
that “poor clients often exert strong pressure to ‘settle out’ so that they can 
pay their bills and have ‘something extra’ to live on.”46  Now, we come to 
the third possibility for why settlement mills tend to represent low-income 
individuals.  It is the most provocative and returns us to our discussion of 
attorney advertising.  Specifically, the ABA’s 1994 Comprehensive Legal 
Needs study found that the poor are far more likely to choose a lawyer on 
the basis of attorney advertising as compared to their wealthier 
counterparts.47 
Why might the poor prefer advertising lawyers?  Three explanations 
again seem likely.  First, as the ABA speculated, as opposed to their 
wealthier counterparts, the poor know fewer lawyers and are less likely to 
have used legal services in the past, meaning they are less likely to know 
more personal ways to find lawyers and also less likely to know the 
reputations of various practitioners.48  And this rings true, given what I have 
                                                          
seriously-injured auto accident claimants with college and graduate degrees were far 
more likely to retain counsel, as compared to claimants with less formal education). 
 45. Not all lawyers accept simple soft-tissue injury cases.  See Stephen Daniels & 
Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225, 1256 tbl.8 
(2004) (reporting on a survey of Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers which found that the 
majority (59.2%) of respondents would not accept a hypothetical case involving “a 
simple car wreck,” clear liability, adequate insurance, and “soft tissue injuries worth 
$3000”); see also Steven Croley, Summary Jury Trials in Charleston County, South 
Carolina, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2008) (“[T]ort plaintiffs with strong 
liability claims but not exorbitant damages have little access to justice.”). 
 46. See Carlin et al., supra note 24, at 77.  For the fact that settlement mills appear 
to resolve claims with relative speed, see Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1502. 
 47. AM. BAR ASS’N, FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 28 
(1994); ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 4 (“Nationally, more than one 
in every five low income households who have used the services of a lawyer found that 
lawyer through some form of advertising.”); accord Scott Sandlin, Poster Boy or 
Scapegoat?, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 12, 1997, at A1 (quoting Will Hornsby of the 
ABA’s Commission on Advertising: “If you look at who responds to advertising, they 
are people who don’t otherwise know how to find a lawyer” and are generally “newly-
relocated, low-income, undereducated, and minorities”); TOM L. LEE, CONSUMER 
ATTITUDES, RESPONSE PATTERNS AND MOTIVATION FACTORS 62, 65 (1985) (reporting 
on a national survey that found low-income respondents were more likely to indicate 
that they would identify a lawyer using advertising, as compared to middle-income or 
high-income respondents). 
 48. See ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 97 (observing that low-
income individuals “are the least likely to know of other resources for finding a 
lawyer,” and, compared to wealthier individuals, are less likely to know the reputations 
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heard from settlement mill practitioners.  As one firm founder publicly 
explained: “There are no lawyers in my clients’ personal social circles.”49  
Another former settlement mill lawyer similarly pointed out that her clients 
“didn’t know what a real law firm was.”50   
Second, there is an issue of targeting.  Some attorney advertisers, the 
ABA found and my interviews at least anecdotally confirm, specifically 
target low-income groups.51  So, for example, one firm founder from 
California called himself the “People’s Lawyer” and, in his advertisements, 
tried “to appeal to folks who may not be upward-income individuals.”52  
Another firm founder, from Louisiana, likewise said his ads targeted 
“working class” individuals and those home during the day.53   
Third and finally, there appears to be a belief shared by some low-
income individuals that attorney advertisers are actually superior to non-
advertisers.  Here, a 1992 New Mexico study, specifically focused on 
direct-mail advertisers, found that the poor and least educated were far 
more likely to think attorney advertisers were of higher quality than non-
advertisers and inclined to give a better deal.54  The least educated were 
                                                          
of various practitioners); see also Kirk Johnson, State Bar Acts to Limit How Lawyers 
Advertise Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/21/nyregion/state-bar-acts-to-limit-how-lawyers-
advertise-themselves.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm  (quoting Professor Bruce Rogow 
as stating: “People who respond to these ads don’t know other lawyers.”); TV 
Advertising Advice for Attorneys, GARY DAVIS MEDIA, 
http://televisionadvertising.com/lawyers.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (advising 
prospective television advertisers to “Know Your Prospect” and specifying: “Your 
prospect from TV advertising is not just someone who needs a lawyer.  Your prospect 
is someone who needs a lawyer and will hire one from TV.  This usually means 
someone who does not already have a lawyer and does not know any lawyers, someone 
whose economic demo, in most cases, is working class or lower.”). 
 49. Mark Ballard, The Ad-Made Man and the Old-Line Firm: Changes in Law 
Practice Are Played Out in Baton Rouge, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A1 (quoting E. 
Eric Guirard). 
 50. Telephone Interview with S.S. (May 30, 2007). 
 51. ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 97 (“Those who advertise 
personal legal services, especially personal injury or other contingency-fee services, 
target low and moderate-income populations.”); cf. Carl Hiaasen, Ad Man Tells 
Lawyers: Cash in on TV, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 1989, at 1B (quoting Paul Landauer, 
who, by his count, has produced more than 7,000 commercials for lawyers in 127 
cities, as stating of his client-audience:  “I want ‘em young, stupid and aggressive.”). 
 52. Deposition of James M. Rogers at 18-19, Wilson v. Law Offices of James M. 
Rogers, No. 823761-7 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2000). 
 53. Barrouquere, supra note 11 (quoting E. Eric Guirard); see also Telephone 
Interview with K.N. (Nov. 8, 2007) (reporting that ads at a South Carolina firm were 
targeted to the “lowest common denominator”); Telephone Interview with L.T. (Mar. 
6, 2008) (reporting that, at the same South Carolina firm, ads were “geared to the lower 
socio-economic class”). 
 54. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at apps. 51, 52, Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of 
the Sup. Ct. for N.M., 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) (No. 96-1780) (appending a December 
1992 survey of Albuquerque adults’ responses to direct mail advertisements that was 
commissioned by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of New Mexico). 
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also twice as likely as their most educated counterparts to incorrectly 
believe that advertising lawyers are legally required to be “experienced in 
the trial” of cases in the substantive area in which they advertise, with a full 
77% of the least educated respondents sharing that view.55  Or, as one 
former settlement mill client said: “I figured . . . they wouldn’t let him on 
TV that much if—you know, if he hadn’t been a good lawyer.”56 
What settlement mills appear to highlight, then, is in some ways a 
replication of the traditional justice gap but in the unlikely contingency fee 
context.  It is playing out not in whether a client gets a lawyer or not, but—
particularly for the small subset of settlement mill clients with serious 
injuries—in the kind of legal services selected.  And it is traceable, quite 
crucially, not to inequities in clients’ ability to afford counsel, because the 
contingency fee takes care of that, but rather, to clients’ ability to choose 
counsel wisely and the unequal resonance of attorney advertising.  This 
fact, I contend, has profound implications for the Bar’s duty to make 
objective information about lawyer quality more readily available. 
 
                                                          
 55. See id.  This finding comports with the result of a 1990 survey of Nevada 
residents, commissioned by the Nevada Lawyers’ Advertising Study Committee.  That 
survey found that, of those who have not completed high school, 67% of respondents 
incorrectly believed “that lawyers who advertise for certain types of cases necessarily 
have specialized knowledge, training and skills in handling those types of cases.”  John 
DeWitt, Report of Findings: Nevada Lawyers’ Advertising Survey, 55 INTER ALIA 11, 
16 (1990).  But cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free 
Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 730-33 
(1997) (raising doubts about bar-commissioned studies).  Also supportive is a recent 
survey of 1554 individuals, which found that individuals who have less education, 
lower income, and who are non-Caucasian are significantly more likely to respond 
favorably to the question: “Would you be more likely or less likely to use a lawyer that 
advertises or would it not make any difference to you?”  That study found, quite 
strikingly, that “[f]or each additional academic degree a potential client receives, his or 
her probability of hiring an attorney who advertises decreases by 23%,” and 
“[c]hanging a potential client’s racial category from non-Caucasian to Caucasian would 
decrease the likelihood he or she would hire an attorney who advertises by 32%.”  
Michael G. Parkinson & Sabrina Neeley, Attorney Advertising: Does It Meet Its 
Objective?, 24 SERVS. MARKETING Q. 17, 25-26 (2003).   
 56. Transcript of Record at 866-67, May v. Bloomfield, No. D029136 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993), at 3324 (testimony of Jerry May). 
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